42 U.S.C. § 1983: From Civil Rights to Harvesting Corneas – Is This Act Misapplied?

I. Introduction
In 1924, a black man was prevented from voting by reason of a Texas statute.1 He
successfully sued election officials for damages, and the Supreme Court overturned the statute
because it prevented citizens from voting based solely on the color of one’s skin.2 In 1978, a
mentally ill woman sued the city of Canton, Ohio, because she was denied medical attention
while in police custody.3 In 1998, police arrested a Native American activist and charged him
with aggravated arson for setting a “Chief Wahoo”4 effigy on fire outside of a Cleveland Indians
baseball game.5 The activist sued the city for damages claiming the arrest violated his First
Amendment rights.
What do a disenfranchised black man, an emotionally disturbed woman, and an American
Indian activist all have in common? Their cases were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(hereinafter called either the Act or Section 1983). This section of the U.S. Code mandates that
anyone acting “under color” of state authority who deprives others of rights guaranteed by either
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the Constitution or federal law shall be liable for the injury.6 The Act was originally passed in
response to blatant civil rights violationsagainst ex -slaves in southern states following the Civil
War.7 It has since been used in an extraordinarily wide variety of actions, including many that its
original framers could never have foreseen.8 Today, litigation under Section 1983 runs the gamut
from students claiming a right to grow long hair9 to prisoners suing over prison violence10 to
bereaved families suing coroners for illegally “harvesting” body parts of loved ones.11 Despite
the breadth of litigation encompassed under the Act, this paper will show that Section 1983 is not
misapplied today.
This article briefly describes the history of Section 1983 and the two landmark Supreme
Court rulings that significantly broadened its scope. Next it presents a primer on the burden of
proof plaintiffs must carry in order to succeed in Section 1983 cases. It then provides a short
overview of the extraordinarily broad category of cases heard under the statute today. Finally,
the author will suggest a few areas where litigation under the Act may occur in the future.
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II. History of § 1983
A. 1865- 1900
Following the Civil War, northern Radical Republicans made a concerted effort to
overturn the effects of years of slavery on southern blacks.12 Towards that purpose, northern
legislators engineered the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution.13 In response, southern legislatures passed Black Codes, designed to keep exslaves in involuntary servitude by greatly restricting their employment opportunities and rights to
land ownership.14 In addition, the Ku Klux Klan and other reactionary groups waged a terror
campaign against blacks in an effort to prevent them from exercising the rights Congress granted
them.15
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The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed in part to allow federal courts to hear cases
brought against people who denied others their right to equal protection under the law.16 It
declared that anyone, “who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage” deprived another of any rights secured under the Constitution, could be held liable for
that deprivation.17 The 1871 Act was designed to ensure that violators would not avoid
punishment by allowing such cases to be heard in federal rather than state courts, where
offenders were unlikely to be convicted for such crimes.18
The Act of 1871 met with limited success for two reasons. First, the political climate
toward Reconstruction cooled rapidly following the Panic of 187319 and the subsequent collapse
of the U.S. economy.20 Then the disputed presidential election of Rutherford B. Hayes led to the
Compromise of 1877 “in which Southern Democrats agreed to the election of Hayes in exchange
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FONER, supra note 12, at 454-59. See also Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort:Monroe v.
Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (1965).
19
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the balance of power between the [political] parties.
As a result of the depression, politicians simply could not concern themselves with the plight of
ex-slaves in the south. They faced more pressing problems in the form of radical labor
movements in the cities and agrarian unrest in the farm-belt. Id.
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for Republican guarantees that federal intervention in civil rights would cease.”21
Second, beginning in 1873, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that culminated
in the “Jim Crow” system of legalized segregation in the south.22 In The Slaughterhouse Cases,23
the Court held that the “privileges and immunities of United States citizenship were not
coextensive with privileges and immunities of state citizenship, and thus the Fourteenth
Amendment did not bring within the scope of federal protection any large category of individual
rights.”24 Next, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment reached state action only, not the
acts of private individuals.25 With this ruling, “as long as no state law authorized or permitted the
action … individuals were free to discriminate.”26 This ruling set the stage for the legalization of
separate educational facilities for blacks and whites under Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.27 With
this “separate but equal” ruling, the Court severely crippled the Act for the next 50 years.28 The
21
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legal framework supporting the rigid Jim Crow system that prevailed in the south until the
1950’s was now firmly in place.29

B. 1900 - 1960

After Plessy, judicial antipathy towards the Act was clear. Even in egregious
circumstances, the Court struggled to invoke the Act to prevent violations of civil rights.30
Despite this, Section 1983 was still employed successfully in some voting rights cases.31 Thus
while the Act was plainly eviscerated by Supreme Court decisions after The Slaughterhouse
Cases, it was still alive, and in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, legal scholars began to envision
ways to use the Act to challenge the unyielding apartheid system prevailing in the south.32 In
particular, petitioners filed suits seeking redress based on deprivation of rights secured by federal
law33 and denial of Due Process or Equal Protection under the laws in state judicial
proceedings.34 Perhaps most importantly, victims of abusive official policies began attempting to
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hold state and local authorities personally liable for civil rights violations under the Act.35 These
efforts met with limited success at first, as the Court continued to construe Section 1983
narrowly.36 Indeed, the Court uniformly held that the Act only applied to violations of federally
protected rights mandated by state law or to violations by state officials acting pursuant to that
law.37 As a result, “if an official acted beyond the scope of his authority, his act was held not to
be state action or ‘under color of law’, and was therefore beyond the enforcement power of
Section 1983.”38 Responding in part to civil rights statutes passed in the late 1950’s,39 the Court
completely overturned this constrictive interpretation in 1961 in the landmark case of Monroe v
Pape.

III. Monroe v. Pape
Early one morning, thirteen Chicago policemen broke into the apartment of an AfricanAmerican couple and forced them to stand naked in their living room while the officers
ransacked their home in search of evidence of a crime.40 The officers then took Mr. Monroe to
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Id. See also SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 7, at 313; Shapo, supra note 18, at 284-87.
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Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 213 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.s. 658 (1978).
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Id. at 169. The treatment afforded the Monroe’s by the Chicago police has been equated to
how the Ku Klux Klan dealt with their enemies in the period immediately preceding passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Monroe’s complaint alleged that the police
forced [the Monroe’s] at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center
of the living room … roused the six Monroe children and herded them into the
living room … Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight,
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jail for interrogation, holding him for ten hours without preferring charges or allowing him to
contact an attorney.41 The Monroes sued both the police officers and the City of Chicago,
alleging that they had no search warrant or arrest warrant, “and that they acted ‘under color of
the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages’ of Illinois and of the City of
Chicago.”42
Based on the principle of stare decisis, a federal circuit court dismissed these claims.43
The court held that the actions of the police officers, while reprehensible, did not rise to the level
of a violation of civil rights under the Act and therefore the couple would have to pursue any
claims in state rather than federal court.44
On appeal, the Supreme Court overruled this application of the law, at least with regard
to the police officers. The Court held that “although their acts were not authorized by state law
… the acts were, independently violations of [the] plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and … the
legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to make actionable such violations
whenever officers act under color of official authority.”45 Furthermore, the Court said that the
calling him ‘nigger’ and ‘black boy’ … another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe …
other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the
floor … the police ransacked every room … Mr. Monroe was then taken to the
police station and detained on ‘open’ charges for ten hours … he was not advised
of his procedural rights … he was not permitted to call his family or an
attorney … and he was subsequently released without criminal charges having been
filed against him.
Shapo, supra note 18, at 277-78 (citing Frankfurter J.’s dissent in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 203).
41

Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.

42

Id.

43

Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1959), overruled by 365 U.S. 167.

44

Id.

45

Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.

8

federal remedy was supplemental to any state remedy. Therefore, “the fact that Illinois by its
constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable search and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in
the federal court.”46
Relying on their interpretation of the legislative history of Section 1983, however, the
Court refused to apply this standard to the City of Chicago.47 Thus after Monroe, municipal
employees could be held liable for their actions in violation of another’s civil rights if those
actions occurred while the employees acted under color of their state authority. This held even if
state law did not authorize those actions. Municipalities, however, were still immune from
prosecution under Section 1983.

IV. Monell v. Department of Social Services
This state of affairs changed in 1978 after female employees of the Department of Social
Services and the Board of Education of New York City sued their respective agencies. The
women sought injunctive relief and back pay because their employers “had as a matter of official
policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were
required for medical reasons.”48 Lower courts had refused to allow the claims for back pay,
because the money would ultimately come from the city of New York, circumventing the
immunity status conferred upon municipalities by Monroe.49
The Supreme Court reviewed its reasoning in Monroe and concluded that decision
46

Id. at 183.
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Id. at 188, 192.
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Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978).
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misinterpreted the legislative history of the Act.50 In Monell, the Court held that their “analysis
of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress
did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to
whom [Section] 1983 applies”51 (emphasis original). As a result, the Court overruled that part of
Monroe holding municipalities immune from prosecution under the Act.52 However,
municipalities could not be held liable for damages solely because they employed tortfeasors or,
in other words, on a respondeat superior basis.53 Instead, municipalities had to institute and
follow an official policy that caused a constitutional tort in order to be found liable for damages
under the Act.54 With this ruling, the Court set the stage for the modern era of Section 1983, the
full import of which is still unknown today, as applications of the Act continue to evolve.

V. Post-Monell Requirements

With Monell, the Supreme Court significantly broadened the scope of liability that
attaches to violations of Section 1983. Furthermore, despite its earlier constrictive view of the
applicability of the Act, the Court now holds that Section 1983 must be given a “liberal
construction.”55
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Notwithstanding this, Monell and subsequent cases establish a stringent hurdle for
plaintiffs to pass before Section 1983 can be successfully brought to bear.56 It is important to
realize that Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights by itself. Rather, it “merely
provides a remedy for the violation of an underlying federally protected right.”57 The Act
establishes a two-part test wherein plaintiffs must prove that defendants violated “substantive or
rights-conferring provision[s] of federal law” while acting under color of state law.58 Without the
deprivation of a federally secured right, plaintiffs cannot successfully pursue a civil claim under
the Act. The deprivation may be based either on constitutionally secured rights or, as the Court
held in post-Monell decisions, on rights secured under federal laws.59
In either type of action, the defendant must act under color of state law. In a case
involving criminal violations of rights, the Supreme Court defined “under color of law” as
“[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”60 Stated differently, under “color” of law
means under “pretense” of law.61 In most instances, this is relatively simple to establish because
“most [Section] 1983 cases are brought against government officials for acts taken as part of
56
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their official duties.”62 In certain circumstances, private individuals may be sued under the Act,
but only if they act alongside government officials and pursuant to state authority.63
Much more problematic for plaintiffs, however, is the fact that they must also prove a
direct causal link between an official policy or custom and any alleged constitutional deprivation
of rights.64 This is often very difficult to do. Mere egregious behavior by government officials is
not enough to prove a Section 1983 violation, because the theory of respondeat superior is
insufficient to prove such a claim.65 Rather, as the Harris court ruled, liability can attach “only
where [a municipality’s] policies are the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’”66
In Harris, the plaintiff had to prove that she was denied medical attention because police were
improperly trained to respond to medical emergencies due to Canton’s “deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”67 Therefore, while it is clear that
Section 1983 is much more widely applied than its framers ever expected it to be, it is not easy to
prove violations under it. On the contrary, it is quite difficult for plaintiffs to meet their two-part
burden of proof.

VI. Current Applications of Section 1983
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Section 1983 suits are now brought in an extraordinarily broad range of categories.68
State agencies, local government entities, courts, schools, correctional institutions, banks,
attorneys, physicians, private hospitals, psychiatrists and voluntary associations have all been
sued under the Act.69 Municipalities alone are sued for violations of conditions in jails,
employment, law enforcement, ambulance or rescue services, assault or rape by municipal
officials, destruction of private property, land use and planning, licenses and permits, and social
services.70
Inmates challenging prison conditions commonly sue under Section 1983.71 It is easy to
see how the Act applies in such situations. Wardens and prison guards are all clearly municipal,
state, or federal employees acting under color of law. Inmates often encounter a variety of
actions that may deprive them of rights guaranteed under the constitution or by federal laws. For
example, a prison guard held a gun to a prisoner’s head, used racial slurs, and threatened to kill
the inmate because he testified in a proceeding involving complaints against the guards.72 The
court held that “in the usual case mere words, without more, do not invade a federally protected
right. It is also true that in most instances of ‘simple assault’ … there is no federal action under
[Section] 1983….”73 Here, however, the guard’s actions amounted to an attempt to prevent the
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A.L.R. 5th, supra note 8, at 11-70.
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inmate from exercising his First Amendment rights of free speech, and as such could be pursued
under the Act.74
Students also commonly sue teachers, administrators, and school boards under Section
1983.75 School districts and institutions of higher education have long been held to be state actors
for purposes of Section 1983.76 As such, their employees may act under color of law in the
course of their daily affairs and actions have been brought for violations of a wide variety of
causes.77
School desegregation was an early and fairly obvious application of the Act.78 Much
narrower and seemingly trivial actions have also been upheld. For example, one court held that a
male student had a federally protected right to grow long hair, and suspending him in an attempt
to make him get a haircut was a violation of Section 1983.79 That court held that “the right of
[the] plaintiff … to wear a hair style of his choosing is a constitutional right guaranteed by the
equal protection or the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”80
Beyond these common uses, plaintiffs have successfully found causes of action in land
use and zoning,81 privacy rights,82 environmental actions,83 and even harvesting of body parts.84
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Without question then, it is apparent that the Act is now both widely used and applied in ways
never foreseen by its framers in 1871.

VII. Potential Future Applications of Section 1983
There are several fields where Section 1983 actions are likely to be brought in the future.
Two of the most likely areas are cases against coaches brought by players or the player’s family
members and cases brought by convicted felons seeking access to DNA evidence required to
pursue appeals.
Coaches at the high school and state university levels are generally employees of state
agencies. As such, they can clearly act under color of state law.85 If they are responsible for the
death or serious injury of their student-athletes, it is conceivable they could be successfully sued
under the Act. For example, if a coach compelled an athlete to run to death, courts could hold
that the athlete was deprived of his right to life without due process of law.86
It is also possible that convicted prisoners seeking DNA evidence in order to prove their
innocence could successfully invoke Section 1983.87 Employees of state agencies control access
to such evidence, and prisoners who are wrongfully convicted without the use of that evidence in
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their defense could legitimately claim they were deprived of their constitutional rights to due
process. Therefore it is likely plaintiffs will be able to carry their burden of proof in such
actions.

VIII. Conclusion
Despite the broad range of cases the Act applies to today, to be successful a plaintiff must
prove both the deprivation of a right secured under either the Constitution or a federal statute and
that the defendant acted under color of state authority. Thus while Section 1983 may be
perceived as being too broadly applied today, this is simply not the case. The plaintiff’s burden
of proof is quite stringent, and courts are extremely adept at applying these standards to cull out
legitimate applications of the Act from spurious ones.88

By randomly skimming cases in any of the A.L.R. 5th sections listed above, one will quickly
see that the majority of suits brought under the Act are lost because the plaintiff cannot meet the
burden of proof required under the two-step test.
88
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